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Images play a key role in modern mediatized conflicts, promoting particular ways of 
understanding those conflicts, what they are about, and who drives them. This article 
examines the visual coverage of the Ukraine conflict in The Guardian, Die Welt, Dagens 
Nyheter, and Helsingin Sanomat in terms of three dominant frames: the Ukraine conflict 
as national power struggle, as Russian intervention, and as geopolitical conflict. Focusing 
on four key events in the conflict between February 2014 and February 2015, and 
combining quantitative and qualitative methods, the framing analysis highlights the need 
to examine news images’ textual content and layout and broader cultural and political 
contexts. We argue that the interplay between visual and textual devices is central to 
the production of hegemonic meanings, particularly when shaping public perceptions of 
key actors and their roles in international conflicts. 
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As political conflicts are defined and, indeed, often enacted in the media (Cottle, 2006; Eskjær, 
Hjarvard, & Mortensen, 2015; Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2010), images are powerful carriers of meaning, 
influencing what we know and how we feel about a conflict (Butler, 2005; Kirkpatrick, 2015). The 
suggestive power of photographs in particular relates to their perceived authenticity and to their ability to 
evoke an emotional response in the viewer (Barthes, 2000; Messaris & Abraham, 2001). Indeed, research 
on the effects of visual framing suggests that news images tend to shape reader and viewer perceptions of 
the reported issue more effectively than textual content (Geise & Baden, 2014; Iyer, Webster, Hornsey, & 
Vanman, 2014; Powell, Boomgaarden, de Swert, & de Vreese, 2015). Clearly, then, the images produced 
and disseminated by multiple actors to influence public perceptions of a conflict and its relevant parties 
play a crucial role in modern warfare (Roger, 2013). 
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The prolonged conflict in Ukraine has heightened geopolitical tensions, with potentially long-term 
repercussions for relations between Russia and the West. At the same time, this conflict has become 
highly mediatized, and both government sources and various nonstate actors have struggled to control the 
public’s interpretation of events and the legitimacy of the conflicting parties’ actions (e.g., Bolin, Jordan, & 
Ståhlberg, 2016; Galeotti, 2015; Snegovaya, 2015). National and international news media have therefore 
become key sites in the Ukraine conflict (Boyd-Barrett, 2015; Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015), and news 
professionals must interpret events for their audiences within a highly contested set of narratives (or 
framings) of the causes of the conflict. 
 
Focusing on three such political framings—the Ukraine conflict as national power struggle, as 
Russian intervention, and as geopolitical conflict—the present study examines how these are visually 
reproduced in news images. Analyzing visual coverage in The Guardian, Die Welt, Dagens Nyheter, and 
Helsingin Sanomat, the article demonstrates how Western European newspapers use images to represent 
events and how this coverage influences political interpretations of the conflict. 
 
News Images in the Framing of Conflicts 
 
Modern conflicts are characterized by the efforts of warring parties and their noncombatant 
supporters to shape public perceptions of events in ways that legitimize their actions and positions 
(Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2010; Tumber & Webster, 2006). The power of mainstream news media to reach 
wide audiences positions them as central to such conflicts. Despite increasing access to Internet and social 
media platforms that enable protagonists to produce and disseminate their own messages, large national 
audiences still obtain most of their information about foreign conflicts through legacy media (Hoskins & 
O’Loughlin, 2015). News journalism arguably remains the primary interpreter of international conflicts for 
the general public and a key gatekeeper of contested views. 
 
Like other actors in mediatized conflicts, news providers actively frame events, constructing 
“interpretive packages” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 3) and “sensible definitions” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7) of 
situations. By selecting and emphasizing one aspect of reality to the exclusion of others, journalists 
influence how audiences make sense of what is at issue, who the central actors are, and where 
responsibility lies (Entman, 1993; Gitlin, 1980). Photography can be conceived of as the primary visual 
component in the multimodal process of news framing (Geise & Baden, 2014; Powell et al., 2015). While a 
news story’s textual content—most notably, its headlines and captions—often informs the interpretation of 
images (Coleman, 2010; Wilkes, 2016), visual elements may also generate autonomous framing effects.  
 
In print media, images are used to highlight the importance of a news story, grabbing the 
reader’s attention and communicating the central argument (Griffin, 2004; Zillmann, Knobloch, & Yu, 
2001). Like verbal framing devices, visuals are used to make certain aspects of the reported events more 
noticeable, memorable, and affective (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Moreover, 
because images communicate nonverbally and are often processed unconsciously by the reader, they can 
be used to gradually normalize certain points of view and interpretations of the issues, or to subtly affect 
impressions of the actors involved (Brantner, Lobinger, & Wetzstein, 2011; Messaris & Abraham, 2001).  
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Recent research has increasingly acknowledged the influence of news images in the interpretation 
of wars and conflicts (e.g., Butler, 2005; Roger, 2013; Zelizer, 2004). While often narrating conflicts in 
terms of the associated civilian distress and suffering, emphasizing the human cost of war (e.g., Fahmy, 
2010; Schwalbe & Dougherty, 2015), images also inform more political interpretations of what is driving 
the conflict and who should be held responsible (Parry, 2010). We are primarily interested in the political 
aspects of news coverage of the Ukraine conflict, and we examine them in terms of two interrelated 
aspects of visual framing: the identification and representation of actors and the reproduction of broader 
political narratives of the conflict. To this end, two research questions are addressed. 
 
RQ1:  Which actors are visualized in news coverage of the Ukraine conflict, and are they presented in a 
negative or an empathetic light? 
 
RQ2:  How and to what extent does visual coverage of the conflict reproduce competing narratives? 
 
RQ1 considers two dimensions of framing: salience and representation. Images determine 
salience by making visible the presence of certain actors as major players while ignoring others (Roger, 
2013; Schwalbe & Dougherty, 2015). Second, images can create favorable or unfavorable representations 
of individuals or groups by depicting them in certain circumstances, activities, and relationships with other 
actors (Messaris & Abraham, 2001). This approach overlaps with the notion of media bias in asking whose 
side the media are on, whose perspective they favor, and which actors are positively or negatively 
represented. Studies of conflict-related imagery suggest that although visual news coverage commonly 
offers several alternative and even contradictory readings, patterns often recur that serve to privilege 
certain viewpoints at the expense of others (Fahmy, 2010; Pantti, 2013). In general, events involving 
violence, destruction, death, and suffering often produce imagery in which one party is repeatedly 
presented as an aggressor and the other as a victim (Bayulgen & Arbatlib, 2013; Parry, 2010). 
 
RQ2 approaches frames as culturally shared “organizing principles” (Reese, 2001) that guide 
journalistic decision making, but that can also be used strategically to locate events within a preferred 
political narrative (Pan & Kosicki, 2001). From this perspective, images can be understood as “potent 
resources for constructing narratives” (Wells, 2007, p. 55) about the causes of the conflict and those 
responsible (Parry, 2010). To the extent that images shape the political interpretation of wars and 
conflicts, then, they interact not only with contemporary reporting of that conflict but also with longer-
term historical narratives of international relations in the political and cultural contexts in which news 
media operate (O’Loughlin, 2011; Reese, 2010; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). Our aim is to analyze 
how, in their use of images, newspapers both draw on and contribute to contested narratives of the 
Ukraine conflict. To begin, the next section outlines three political interpretations of the conflict that 
inform public debate in the West. 
 
Three Western Framings of the Ukraine Conflict 
 
Given its profound implications for the European Union’s enlargement process, economic and 
political relationships between Russia and the European Union, and Europeans’ sense of security, the 
military conflict in Ukraine has been the subject of intense public debate in Western European countries. 
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Most observers agree that the decision by Viktor Yanukovych (Ukraine’s former president) to abandon an 
association agreement with the European Union in November 2013 mobilized antigovernment opposition 
in the form of the Maidan movement, marking the beginning of what has come to be known as the 
“Ukraine conflict.” Beyond this, however, both political and academic observers have advanced widely 
differing interpretations of the nature of the conflict, and these public framings have significant political 
and ideological consequences.  
 
The first of these accounts emphasizes the domestic roots of the present conflict (e.g., 
Ishchenko, 2014; Sakwa, 2015). It locates the conflict within the postcommunist era of state building, 
marked by a contested national identity, differing visions of a multicultural society, and a broken political 
system dominated by rival oligarchs, contributing to deepening rifts within Ukrainian civil society 
(Ishchenko, 2015; Wilson, 2009). Yanukovych advanced the interests of Eastern oligarchs and was voted 
into power largely by eastern Ukrainians, who traditionally favor a multicultural vision and strong ties with 
Russia, but the present regime has actively pursued closer economic ties with Western Europe, advocating 
a monocultural vision of Ukraine that is clearly distinct from Russian culture and identity (Sakwa, 2015). 
This view of the conflict suggests that the ousting of Yanukovych had the effect of radicalizing anti-Maidan 
groups in the eastern Donbas region, who were encouraged by Russia’s annexation of Crimea to mount a 
militant insurgency against the new regime in Kiev (Gessen, 2014). In summary, this domestic account 
frames the present conflict as essentially the continuation of a long-term national power struggle that has 
descended into civil war. 
 
A second perspective explains the Ukraine conflict in terms of the Russian government’s actions 
and interests. According to this narrative, political and economic pressure from the Kremlin forced 
Yanukovych to reject the EU deal (Haukkala, 2015). Russia has further exacerbated the conflict by 
occupying and then annexing the Crimean Peninsula and by mounting a highly sophisticated “hybrid war” 
against Ukraine that includes a military campaign in eastern areas of the country (Galeotti, 2015). This 
account frames the conflict in terms of Russian intervention in Ukraine (e.g., Motyl, 2015). 
 
A third account portrays the Ukraine conflict in terms of a clash between Russia and the West, 
framing it as a geopolitical conflict (e.g., Rutland, 2015). According to the geopolitical narrative, the 
Ukraine conflict is the outcome of longstanding disputes between Russia and Western powers over the 
economic and military alignment of countries that were formerly socialist and Soviet states. In Ukraine, 
Russia’s reaction to the eastward spread of both the European Union and NATO has been to protect its 
military and economic interests by creating a counter-pole to a unipolar Europe (dominated by the 
European Union) and a unipolar world (dominated by the United States; Haukkala, 2015; Sakwa, 2015). 
In this view, the conflict has been precipitated by these rival geopolitical powers, forcing Ukrainians to 
choose between two mutually exclusive paths of political and institutional development—that is, between 
the United States and the European Union on one hand and Russia on the other—both with drastic impacts 
on the country’s economic development and foreign relations. 
 
Each of these dominant narratives in the Western debate captures particular aspects of the crisis, 
and the three are not necessarily mutually exclusive. However, when operationalized in journalism to 
interpret unfolding events, it becomes clear how they selectively attribute responsibility to the conflict’s 
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various parties, offering divergent political interpretations. The national power struggle frame highlights 
the role of Ukrainian political leaders, oligarchs, civil society groups, and armed insurgents while 
downplaying the presence and role of foreign powers. In contrast, the Russian intervention frame focuses 
attention on the actions of the Kremlin as the ultimate driver of events, portraying Ukrainians as victims of 
foreign aggression. Finally, the geopolitical conflict frame interprets the crisis as essentially a “proxy 
conflict” in a “new Cold War” between superpowers (Haukkala, 2015; Legvold, 2014), focusing on the 
actions of the European, U.S., and Russian governments as active drivers of the conflict and disregarding 
the independent agency of Ukrainian leaders, civil society groups, and the Donbas insurgents. 
 
Materials and Method 
 
Four national daily newspapers were selected for the purposes of the study: The Guardian, Die 
Welt, Dagens Nyheter (DN), and Helsingin Sanomat (HS). Ranking among the top three quality dailies (in 
terms of circulation) in the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, and Finland, respectively, all four are 
national agenda setters and as such exert significant influence on the reproduction of popular 
understandings of the Ukraine conflict. For this study, we confined the material to be used from the 
selected publications to four specific periods in the evolution of the Ukraine conflict. Each of these periods 
related to a highly publicized incidence of violence or armed battle of particular relevance to the overall 
framing of the conflict. Such dramatic occurrences of death and suffering tend to induce strong emotions, 
highlighting issues of guilt and responsibility and asserting the sense of a moral obligation to act 
(Chouliaraki, 2008; Parry, 2010). 
 
The first period (February 21–27, 2014) commenced with reports of violent clashes around 
Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kiev on February 20, which resulted in the death of at 
least 39 protesters and 17 police officers (Sakwa, 2015). This period (the “Maidan period”) also includes 
the chaotic events surrounding the deposing of President Yanukovych and the first steps taken by Russian 
forces in occupying the Crimean Peninsula. The second period (May 3–7, 2014) centered on an incident in 
the city of Odessa in which more than 40 antigovernment protesters died when trapped inside a burning 
trade-union building on May 2 (see Boyd-Barrett, 2015; Sakwa, 2015). This (the “Odessa period”) also 
coincided with the Ukrainian army’s offensive against the separatist rebels in Donbas. The third period 
(the “MH17 period,” July 18–31, 2014), began with the shooting down of Flight MH17 on July 17, 2014, 
and continued with the efforts of the international community to recover the victims’ bodies and to 
investigate the crash, and the United States’ and European Union’s imposition of economic sanctions 
against Russia. The fourth period (the “Minsk period,” February 11–22, 2015) began with the meeting in 
Minsk between the leaders of France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine and the leadership of the separatist 
insurgents to agree on terms for ending the military confrontation. Following the deal, however, fighting 
continued in eastern Ukraine, including particularly fierce battles for control of the city of Debaltseve.  
 
The four newspapers’ issues for the selected periods were manually scanned for images related 
to news articles that explicitly dealt with the relevant events. As images were often associated with more 
than one story about the conflict, all image-text combinations laid out on a single page or as a spread 
were selected as the unit of analysis. Material from Die Welt, DN, and HS was collected from the printed 
editions. Because The Guardian’s print edition was unavailable to us when conducting the study, we 
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analyzed its online versions.1 In total, the analyzed material comprised 402 separate image-text 
combinations from 38 days of coverage: 161 from The Guardian, 85 from Die Welt, 75 from DN, and 81 
from HS. 
 
We adopted a multimodal approach to the analysis of visual framing, taking into account that 
textual content (most notably captions and headlines) typically directs the interpretation of news images 
(Messaris & Abraham, 2001). The analysis combined quantitative and qualitative approaches (see Van 
Gorp, 2007). As RQ1 (concerning the visual salience and representation of various parties to the conflict) 
was more quantitative in nature, we coded the material for all actors and actor groups that appeared in 
the images, including Maidan protesters, Ukrainian soldiers, eastern Ukrainian insurgents, civilians, and 
Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian political leaders. Drawing on social semiotic approaches to the visual 
representation of human actors and relations (Jewitt & Oyama, 2003; Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996), we 
examined how the images depicted actors’ specific activities or roles in the reported events (e.g., victim, 
aggressor, hero, leader, onlooker). In interpreting actors’ activities and roles, we also looked for textual 
cues in the captions and headlines. To simplify the analysis, the various actor roles were then grouped 
into positive, neutral, and negative representations. For instance, a representation of people in the Maidan 
was considered positive if the image, caption, or headline portrayed them as peaceful protesters and as 
negative if it drew attention to armed and far-right elements among the protesters. In the case of political 
actors, a positive representation would associate them with, for instance, peace efforts, widespread 
popular support, or a position of authority and influence among other leaders, whereas a negative 
representation would associate them with aggression, criminality, authoritarianism, isolation, or a position 
of weakness. If an image and its immediate textual context were noncommittal about the pictured actor or 
if the visuals and text offered contradictory representations, we coded the representation as neutral. Two 
researchers coded the material, with a percentage agreement between the coders (Neuendorf, 2002) 
established at 0.91 on the identification of actors and 0.82 on the tone of representations. 
 
RQ2 involved a more qualitative interpretation of coverage in terms of the three political 
narratives or frames described earlier. Key decisions in the visual framing process include selecting a 
scene and perspective (in preference to others), choosing an image for publication, and positioning it on a 
page (Coleman, 2010; Messaris & Abraham, 2001). We deduced that the national power struggle frame 
was reproduced when stories focused visually on Ukrainian political leaders, activists, and civil society 
groups. The Russian intervention frame included images that focused on Russia’s presence in the conflict 
or presented Ukrainians as victims of aggression while attributing violent acts to Russia in images, 
headlines, or captions. The geopolitical conflict frame focused visually on the presence of international 
leaders without singling out Russia, undermined the independent agency of Ukrainian actors by 
associating them with foreign powers (e.g., using the label “pro-Russian” to describe Ukrainian activists or 
                                                 
1 Using the daily archive provided by the UK edition of theguardian.com (see 
http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian), we selected only those online articles that also appeared in 
the printed edition of the newspaper to ensure maximum comparability with the other newspapers. It 
should be noted, however, that online versions of articles in The Guardian tend to differ from print 
versions in their length, headlines, and images used. Findings and conclusions concerning those articles 
are therefore only partly applicable to the printed edition of The Guardian. 
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fighters), or presented Western Europeans as victims of aggression while attributing violent acts to Russia. 
In cases where none of these three frames was apparent, or if the presence of two or all three made it 
impossible to select just one, we coded the visual frame as none/other. The percentage agreement 
between the two coders on visual frames was 0.88. 
 
Overall, although representing distinct approaches to visual framing, the two research questions 
were found to partly overlap in that quantitative findings concerning the salience of actors and how they 
were represented largely aligned with our observations about the reproduction of political narratives. 
Nevertheless, the two modes of analysis potentially increased the reliability of our findings and 
interpretations by providing two slightly different views of the same material. The next section discusses 
those findings, focusing on each of the three political framings of the conflict in turn. 
 
Findings 
 
Table 1 summarizes the number of visual representations of selected actors and actor groups in 
each newspaper. It also defines the representation score for each actor, calculated by subtracting the 
number of negative representations from the number of positive representations. 
 
As Table 1 indicates, Ukrainian civilians were the single most frequently depicted actor group in 
visual coverage of the conflict in all newspapers. Table 1 also indicates that their representations were 
overwhelmingly positive, as were those of non-Ukrainian civilians. This is because civilians were typically 
depicted in roles that tend to generate feelings of sympathy (Chouliaraki, 2008; Höijer, 2004): fleeing 
from their homes (see Figure 4), witnessing the destruction of their personal property (Figure 5), or 
grieving over human casualties (Figure 8). In the almost total absence of direct depictions of death,2 the 
papers often employed images of civilians alongside images of material destruction or symbols such as 
candles, flowers, crosses, or coffins to illustrate the human cost of the conflict.  
 
Previous research has shown that this humanitarian framing is a prevalent feature of the visual 
coverage of conflicts in Western media (e.g., Fahmy, 2010; Pantti, 2013; Schwalbe & Dougherty, 2015). 
However, whereas images of civilian life tend to induce compassion, those of more active groups such as 
protesters, insurgents, and army troops and those of powerful individuals such as political leaders are 
more often associated with political interpretations of the conflict’s driving forces (see Table 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Only 2% of instances included images of dead bodies. 
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Table 1. The Overall Number of Visualizations and the Representation  
Score of Selected Actors and Actor Groups in Each Newspaper. 
 
 The Guardian Die Welt DN HS Total 
Actor/actor group N +/- N +/- N +/- N +/- + - 
Ukrainian civilians 35 +19 20 +12 34 +19 31 +19 120 +69 
Non-Ukrainian 
civilians 
22 +7 17 +5 6 +3 7 +5 52 +20 
Maidan activists 23 +10 19 +11 14 +5 16 +3 72 +29 
Anti-
Maidan/proseparati
st activists 
10 +1 5 +1 9 -2 5 -2 29 -2 
Ukrainian army 
forces 
21 +4 13 +1 9 +4 7 +2 50 +11 
Separatist forces 28 -10 14 -1 14 -5 8 -6 64 -22 
Viktor Yanukovych 2 -2 4 -3 7 -3 2 -2 15 -10 
Petro Poroshenko 8 +4 6 +2 2 +1 6 0 22 +7 
Ukrainian 
opposition leaders 
9 +6 6 +1 11 +3 6 +6 32 +16 
PRD and PRL 
leaders* 
– – – – 1 0 – – 1 0 
Vladimir Putin 26 -9 11 -6 12 -6 7 +1 56 -20 
Angela Merkel 6 +1 10 +8 3 +1 5 +5 25 +15 
Francois Hollande 5 +1 5 +3 1 +1 2 +2 13 +7 
Barack Obama 4 -1 3 +2 2 0 2 +1 11 +2 
* PRD refers to the People’s Republic of Donetsk, and PRL refers to the People’s Republic of Luhansk. 
 
As to political framing, most (60–70%) of the articles in each paper included visual and textual 
cues that could be interpreted in terms of one of the three political accounts of the conflict. Table 2 
illustrates the salience of each of the three frames in the four newspapers, indicating slight differences in 
their visual framing preferences. The national power struggle frame was slightly more frequent in DN 
(21.3%) and HS (21.0%) than in The Guardian (16.8%) and Die Welt (17.6%); in other words, the two 
Nordic papers directed more attention to political and social divisions in Ukraine. The Russian intervention 
frame was most often emphasized by Die Welt, where 23.5% of all visualizations directed attention to 
Russia’s influence or Ukraine’s victimhood. In contrast, HS was notably reticent in this regard, with only 
11.1% of its visual coverage clearly reproducing the Russian intervention frame. Geopolitical conflict was 
by far the most prevalent visual frame in The Guardian (27.3%) and HS (27.2%), and it also 
predominated in Die Welt (24.7%). 
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Table 2. The Percentage of Articles Contributing to the  
Three Conflict Frames in Each Newspaper. 
 
Visual frame The Guardian 
N = 161 
Die Welt 
N = 85 
DN 
N = 75 
HS 
N = 81 
National power struggle 16.8 17.6 21.3 21.0 
Russian intervention 20.5 23.5 18.7 11.1 
Geopolitical conflict 27.3 24.7 18.7 27.2 
Other/none 35.4 29.5 41.3 40.7 
 
 
Framing the Conflict as a National Power Struggle 
 
Whenever news images depicted Ukrainians as actively involved in the reported events rather 
than as passive civilians, captions typically labeled them as members, supporters, or opponents of specific 
groups. As shown in Table 1, the most visually salient groups included the Maidan activists (comprising 
both demonstrators and lightly armed self-defense groups) and the anti-Maidan and pro-separatist 
activists. From the Odessa period onward, Ukrainian army troops and armed separatists were also 
frequently depicted in news images. The third visually salient group of Ukrainian actors comprised political 
leaders, including the presidents (Viktor Yanukovych and Petro Poroshenko), and various opposition 
leaders during the Maidan period. 
 
A significant proportion of the conflict’s visual coverage therefore depicted Ukrainian actors in 
ways that not only directed attention to the existence of conflicting societal interests and aspirations 
among Ukrainians but also assigned them to two antagonistic camps: those supporting the regime and 
those opposing it. In this way, the selection of images was both informed by and contributed to the 
framing of the Ukraine conflict as a national power struggle. At times, the selected photographs and layout 
seemed to underline this interpretation of the conflict. Figure 1 illustrates two such cases. On the left, 
DN’s report on civil unrest in the Crimean city of Simferopol on February 27, 2014, includes an image that 
sets two groups of demonstrators against each other. The image’s composition assigns the highest 
salience to the polarization of these two groups and their hostile facial expressions. Similarly, Die Welt’s 
report from eastern Ukraine on May 4, 2014, is introduced by a cover that juxtaposes an image of an 
antigovernment activist wearing a face mask with an image of a group of smiling protesters waving 
Ukrainian flags. The layout and imagery not only emphasize the political tensions among Ukrainians but 
also advance two very distinct constructions of civic activism. In the upper picture, a militant “pro-Russian 
separatist” is depicted as defying the police with a wild look on his face, and the lower picture represents 
“pro-Ukrainian demonstrators” as a joyful, peaceful, and unmistakably youthful and modern crowd, one of 
whose members is apparently browsing an iPad. 
 
International Journal of Communication 11(2017)  Whose War, Whose Fault?  483 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Visualizing a divided nation. 
Sources: Dagens Nyheter, February 27, 2014, pp. 14–15 (photos: Paul Hansen/DN) and Die Welt, May 4, 
2014, p. 15 (photos: Reuters, Getty Images). 
 
Die Welt’s choice of photographs in this particular case exemplifies a highly consistent pattern 
across the four newspapers when presenting civil society groups. During the Maidan period, the papers 
tended to grant high visibility to Maidan activists and opposition leaders, presenting them primarily in a 
positive light (Table 1). In contrast, representations of anti-Maidan demonstrators and activists who 
subsequently mobilized against the transitional government were far less favorable.  
 
As Table 1 indicates, there were similar patterns in the selective representation of Ukrainian 
political leaders. During the Maidan period, political leaders who opposed the Yanukovych government 
were visually prominent and were represented mainly in a positive light. In particular, the opposition 
leader Yulia Tymoshenko, who was pictured greeting jubilant supporters and addressing the crowds at 
Maidan following her liberation from a prison hospital (Figure 2), symbolized the popular struggle for 
freedom. Coupled with predominantly negative representations of President Yanukovych, the visual 
framing of the Maidan events tended to legitimize popular and political opposition against the incumbent 
regime. In contrast, during the Odessa, MH17, and Minsk periods, President Poroshenko was the only 
Ukrainian political leader who appeared in news images, and opposition politicians remained unseen. In 
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this way, Ukraine’s internal political struggles were rendered largely invisible after the Maidan period, and 
aside from a single article in DN on July 21, 2014, the newspapers featured no images of the leaders of 
the self-proclaimed People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Symbolizing a popular struggle for freedom. 
Sources: The Guardian (www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/tymoshenko-release-centre-stage-
ukraine-soap-opera), February 23, 2014 (photo: Sergey Kozlov/EPA); Dagens Nyheter, January 23, 2014, 
p. 1 (photo: Paul Hansen/DN); Die Welt, February 24, 2014, p. 1 (photo: Getty Images); and Helsingin 
Sanomat, January 23, 2014, p. B1 (photo: Kalle Koponen/HS). 
 
The great majority of newspaper images of Ukrainian civil society groups and politicians appeared 
during the Maidan and Odessa periods. As a result, the national power struggle frame was particularly 
prevalent in these early stages of the conflict in all four newspapers. During the MH17 and Minsk periods, 
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however, activists and politicians (with the exception of President Poroshenko) did not appear in any 
images, and Ukrainians were now represented almost entirely by civilians, Ukrainian army soldiers, and 
armed separatist fighters. As discussed below, visualizations of these latter groups often contributed to 
the Russian intervention or geopolitical conflict frames. 
 
Framing the Conflict as a Russian Intervention 
 
Perhaps the most striking feature of visual coverage of the conflict was the position of Vladimir 
Putin as the most frequently depicted individual in all four newspapers (see Table 1). As a consequence, 
the sense of Russia’s presence in the conflict was frequently reinforced, along with Putin’s implied 
leadership and therefore his responsibility for events unfolding. In this regard, The Guardian and DN were 
particularly active in their use of visuals to direct attention toward the Russian president. Although Die 
Welt published almost as many images of Chancellor Merkel as of Putin, the German paper also deployed 
visual symbols such as the Kremlin towers, the Russian flag, and even a historical photo of Red Army 
soldiers marching through Prague in 1968, so alluding to Russia’s presence, role, and responsibility in the 
Ukraine conflict.  
 
Aside from HS, the papers generally represented Putin in a negative light. In the most extreme 
instances, these negative representations derived from a direct visual or textual association between Putin 
and the violence and human distress in Ukraine (see Figures 4 and 5). Less striking examples of such 
negative representation depicted Putin next to traditional symbols of power, such as the Russian flag or 
coat of arms, or associated him with biker gangs or military personnel (Figure 3). Additionally, negative 
textual characterizations in headlines or captions complemented these visual practices—for instance, The 
Guardian’s headlines included such words as “brutish,” “cronies,” “paranoia,” and “Tsar” alongside images 
of Putin. Together, images and texts regularly contributed to perceptions of the Russian president as an 
“autocratic” leader, underscoring his “otherness” compared with “democratic” Western leaders (see also 
Molchanov, 2015). 
 
In combination, this visual emphasis and the pattern of predominantly negative representations 
of Putin confirms that these papers’ visual coverage was largely informed by the framing of the conflict as 
a Russian intervention and reproduced that framing. On occasion, the papers’ use of visual or textual 
elements seemed to clearly direct readers toward this interpretation. Figure 4 presents three striking 
examples. On the left, a DN article visually constructs a connection between a shot Maidan protester and 
the Russian president, and the headline also emphasizes Russia’s importance. On the right, a story in HS 
associates an image of Putin with a picture of fleeing civilians. In both cases, imagery reflecting the 
negative consequences of the conflict is used to assign political responsibility. In the third example, The 
Observer3 editorial constructs a textual association between Putin and the children’s toys found at the 
MH17 crash site.4 
                                                 
3 The Observer is the Sunday edition of The Guardian. 
4 Indeed, compared with the print papers, The Guardian’s online edition had less scope to use 
compositional and layout elements as visual framing tools, as individual stories appeared on separate Web 
pages and typically included only one photo. Instead, its use of visuals to emphasize Russia’s role in the 
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Figure 3. Othering Putin. 
Sources: The Guardian (www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/22/eu-plans-further-sanctions-russia-
putin-mh17), July 22, 2014 (photo: ITAR-TASS/Barcroft Media); Dagens Nyheter, July 24, 2014, p. 4 
(photo: Ivan Sekretarev/AFP); Die Welt, February 14, 2015, p. 7 (photo: Sergei Chirikov/DPA). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
conflict commonly involved assigning greater salience to Putin than to any other political leaders (see 
Table 1). 
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Figure 4. Associating Putin with Ukraine’s violence and distress. 
Sources: Dagens Nyheter, February 23, 2014, p. 10 (photos: AFP); Helsingin Sanomat, February 12, 
2015, p. A2 (photos: Valentin Ogyrenko/AFP; Gleb Garanits/Reuters); The Guardian 
(www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/20/observer-editorial-flight-mh17-west-must-challenge-
russia-putin), July 20, 2014 (photo: Anastasia Vlasova/EPA). 
 
On a number of occasions, Die Welt also used visual means to imply Russia’s responsibility for 
the conflict. Figure 5 illustrates how the newspaper placed a caricature of Putin between pictures of 
destroyed property and Donetsk residents in July 2014 and again highlighted Putin as the principal actor 
in February 2015. In the latter case, Putin’s relevance was communicated through the size and positioning 
of the picture on the right side of the page (see Jewitt & Oyama, 2003; Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996). 
Putin’s facial expression, communicating contentment, is also noteworthy. In comparison to the serious 
demeanor of the other three politicians, this expression invited readers to see Putin as the winner in a 
political battle and therefore as a dominant actor in the conflict. At the same time, Putin’s expression can 
be seen to imply his indifference to the material destruction and civilian distress registered in other photos 
in the same spread. 
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Figure 5. Implying Putin’s aggression, power, and responsibility. 
Sources: Die Welt, July 30, 2014, p. 7 (photos: Ivan Bobersky/DPA; Sergei Supinsky/AFP; Bulent 
Kilic/AFP) and February 13, 2015, pp. 4–5 (photos: Sergei Grits/AP; Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP; Vasily 
Fedosenko/Reuters). 
 
The Russian intervention frame may also have informed depictions of Ukrainian actors that 
occasionally implied Ukraine’s victimhood (Bayulgen & Arbatlib, 2013). The lower image in Figure 5, for 
instance, depicts President Poroshenko as a somewhat diminished figure; his pensive look and the 
downward tilt of his head communicate resignation, if not submission, especially as it is juxtaposed with a 
much larger image of a contented-looking Putin. More notably, all four papers published images of 
exhausted soldiers after the battle for Debaltseve in February 2015 (Figure 6). The DN and HS photos 
focused attention on the facial and bodily expressions of agony and chaotic retreat, and the headlines in 
The Guardian and Die Welt described the soldiers’ feelings. These images arguably invited the reader to 
feel compassion for the Ukrainian troops and suggested that Ukraine was the victim in the conflict. 
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Notably, no such pictures were published of separatist troops. It is also worth noting that the papers 
customarily labeled the soldiers as “Ukrainian,” so denoting the other party as non-Ukrainian. Additionally, 
images of the soldiers commonly highlighted Ukrainian flags or Ukrainian colors in the soldiers’ uniforms 
or equipment. 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 6. Empathizing with Ukrainian soldiers. 
Sources: The Guardian (www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/18/ukrainian-soldiers-share-horrors-of-
debaltseve-battle-after-stinging-defeat), February 19, 2015 (photo: Gleb Garanich/Reuters); Dagens 
Nyheter, February 19, 2015, pp. 8–9 (photos: Paul Hansen/DN); Die Welt, February 20, 2015, p. 6 
(photo: Ross McDonnell); and Helsingin Sanomat, February 19, 2015, pp. A20–A21 (photo: Gleb 
Garanich/Reuters). 
 
Images directing attention to Russian involvement and Ukrainian victimhood in the conflict were 
published in all four periods, but they were most in evidence during the MH17 and Minsk periods. In 
particular, The Guardian, Die Welt, and DN seemed to place great emphasis on Russia’s role in the conflict 
(see Table 2). In comparison, HS was notably reticent in its visual treatment of Russia’s role in the 
conflict. Moreover, aside from one instance in which images were used to associate Putin with the flight of 
Ukrainian refugees (Figure 4), the Finnish daily largely avoided negative visual representations of Putin or 
any direct association between the Russian president and the warfare in Ukraine. 
 
 
490  Markus Ojala, Mervi Pantti, & Jarkko Kangas International Journal of Communication 11(2017) 
Framing a Geopolitical Conflict 
 
Although images of Putin often served to highlight Russia’s role in the conflict, he was not always 
presented alone. During the Minsk period in particular, he was frequently depicted next to other 
international leaders, notably Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande. In this way, although significantly less 
visible in the overall coverage, these two Western European leaders became salient actors in the conflict 
during the Minsk negotiations. All four newspapers also published images of Barack Obama in their 
coverage of the conflict (see Table 1). By visually highlighting the presence of these international leaders, 
these images reinforced a sense of the power and responsibility of other states in the Ukraine conflict and 
its resolution.  
 
The visuals from the Minsk negotiations tended to represent Western leaders as closely aligned, 
in marked contrast to Putin’s alienation (Figures 5 and 7). Figure 7 illustrates how Die Welt and HS, in 
particular, highlighted the close and even affectionate relationship between Merkel and Hollande. 
Meanwhile, images in The Guardian and DN implied Putin’s isolation from the other three political leaders 
by using empty space and visual demarcation lines, appearing in the form of a tie (The Guardian) and a 
vertical line on wallpaper (DN) (see Jewitt & Oyama, 2003; Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996). 
 
The combined emphasis on the presence of international leaders and representational patterns 
that set the closeness of Western leaders against the isolation of the Russian president suggests that the 
visual coverage of the Minsk negotiations, in particular, was informed by and reproduced the framing of 
the Ukraine crisis as a geopolitical conflict. By focusing on superpower rivalry over the future of Ukraine 
within either the Western or the Russian sphere of influence, this framing downplays the significance and 
independent agency of Ukrainian actors. Accordingly, the insurgent fighters of eastern Ukraine and their 
supporters were habitually labeled as “pro-Russian separatists” in headlines and captions, reproducing a 
problematic generalization about the aims of the antigovernment opposition (see Boyd-Barrett, 2015) and 
implying their non-independent agency. Similarly, during the Minsk ceasefire negotiations, the official 
perception of the post-Yanukovych government as “pro-European” was visually supported in The Guardian 
and DN by depicting Poroshenko as close to or between Merkel and Hollande, implying his closeness to 
Western powers (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Visualizing Western closeness and Russian isolation. 
Sources: Die Welt, February 21, 2015, p. 1 (photo: Thibault Camus/AP); Helsingin Sanomat, February 13, 
2015, pp. A2–A3 (photo: Grigori Dukor/Reuters); The Guardian 
(www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/15/angela-merkel-germany-ukraine-putin-obama), 
February 15, 2015 (photo: Sergei Grits/AP); and Dagens Nyheter, February 12, 2015, p. 14 (photo: AP). 
 
If the newspapers’ representation of Ukrainian actors frequently contributed to the proxy war 
element of the geopolitical conflict frame, their coverage of the MH17 incident set Russia and the West in 
more direct confrontation. Imagery of the crash site and of the victims of the downed passenger plane, 
their personal belongings, and the mourners was a recurring visual theme during this period. On average, 
45% of stories in the four papers at this time used visuals to focus attention on the incident and its human 
victims. As the casualties were overwhelmingly Western European, the newspapers’ visual coverage of the 
MH17 incident often worked to present Westerners as victims in the conflict (Figure 8). The presence of 
“pro-Russian” separatist forces at the crash site was another prevalent visual theme in this period 
(featuring in 13% of stories on average). In this way, much of the visual coverage of the MH17 period 
tended to reproduce the geopolitical conflict frame. 
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Figure 8. Visualizing Western victimhood. 
Sources: The Guardian (www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/21/dutch-king-willem-alexander-meets-
mh17-relatives-utrecht), July 21, 2014 (photo: Ever-Jan Daniels/AFP/Getty Images) and 
(www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/23/parents-of-three-children-killed-on-mh17-living-in-a-hell-
beyond-hell) July 24, 2014 (photo: Australian Associated Press); Helsingin Sanomat, July 24, 2014, p. 
A22 (photo: Cris Toala Olivares/Reuters); Die Welt, July 21, 2014, p. 4 (photos: Reuters; Vadim 
Ghirda/AP; Paul Jeffers/Getty Images; Rob Stothard/Getty Images); and Dagens Nyheter, July 19, 2014, 
pp. 10–11 (photos: Phil Nijhuis/AP; Robin Utrecht/AOP; Joshua Paul/AOP; Paul Hansen/DN). 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Visual framings of international conflicts can be interrogated both as patterns of representation 
guided by journalistic conventions and as the presumed intentional use of images to promote a certain 
interpretation of events. International photo agencies drove much of the visual coverage in all four 
newspapers: 78% in The Guardian, 92% in Die Welt, 65% in DN, and 60% in HS contained images 
provided by Western photo agencies. As a result, the newspapers shared highly congruent imagery during 
all of the four analyzed events—highlighting protests, opposition leaders, and the consequences of 
violence during the Maidan protests; riots, violent confrontations, and armed insurgency in Odessa; the 
wreckage of the plane crash site, insurgents guarding the site, and people in mourning in the wake of the 
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MH17 incident; and international leaders and Ukrainian soldiers during the negotiations in Minsk. These 
largely unintentional patterns of representation—dictated in part by Western photo agencies and the 
European media’s shared news values and professional routines in covering international events (see also 
Curran, Esser, Hallin, Hayashi, & Lee, 2015)—contributed to the normalization of certain views of the 
conflict and its participants.  
 
Yet, despite the broad similarities in visual coverage, each period also provided evidence of 
publication-specific visual framing decisions in which interacting visual and verbal cues were used to 
highlight particular aspects of events or to suggest a particular interpretation of the conflict. The 
newspapers arguably drew on the broader political and cultural context of the Western public sphere, 
dominated by the three alternate framings (national power struggle, Russian intervention, and geopolitical 
conflict), each of which finds fertile ground in deeply rooted Western views of Russia and Europe’s 
easternmost parts. The national power struggle frame reflects cultural perceptions of post-Soviet states as 
still underdeveloped economically, politically, and culturally, their transition to liberal market economics 
hampered by authoritarian leaders and an inability to create a viable multiparty democracy, leading 
inevitably to winner-takes-all politics and societal instability (Kuus, 2004; Melegh, 2006). The Russian 
intervention frame is representative of the anti-Russian perspectives prevailing in Western news media 
coverage of previous international conflicts, such as the wars in Chechnya and the Russo-Georgian conflict 
of 2008 (e.g., Bayulgen & Arbatlib, 2013; Heinrich & Tanaev, 2009; Lieven, 2000; Malinkina & McLeod, 
2000). This frame tends to equate Russia with the former Soviet Union, characterizing its role in 
international politics as an aggressor with imperial aspirations. Finally, the geopolitical conflict frame 
draws on historical Cold War narratives, depicting Russia and the West in a state of perpetual conflict 
(e.g., Hanson, 1995; Norris, 1995). However, when these frames are operationalized as journalistic 
representations to interpret unfolding events in Ukraine, it becomes clear how the differing roles they 
attribute to the main parties in the conflict can be used to advocate contrasting political responses.  
 
The primarily negative representations of Putin in The Guardian, Die Welt, and DN suggest that 
their visual constructions support tougher policies against Russia. In this respect, The Guardian has been a 
staunch defender of NATO’s military preparations as a necessary response to “Russian sabre-rattling” 
(“The Guardian view on NATO’s exercises,” 2015), and Die Welt’s coverage of the conflict can be read as 
expressing a committed pro-Western stance within Germany’s highly charged political debate (Neukirch, 
2014). DN’s effective construction of Putin as the “other” can be seen as a strategic choice for a paper 
that has actively promoted Sweden’s accession to NATO (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2014). Finally, while HS 
plays a similar role in the Finnish debate about Finland’s Western (military) alignment, the paper’s 
relatively moderate line on Russia’s role in the Ukraine conflict may reflect Finland’s traditional foreign 
policy consensus prioritizing good bilateral relations with the Kremlin (Etzold & Haukkala, 2013). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This exploration of visual framing of an international conflict in newspapers has highlighted how 
selected actors are rendered more visually salient than others and how their roles in the conflict are 
presented more or less favorably. It is our contention that any examination of how such political framings 
are articulated through subtle visual cues should combine a quantitative approach with close scrutiny of 
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photographs—approaching visual framing both in terms of patterns of visual coverage and at the level of 
individual images and layout solutions. 
Additionally, as news framing is rarely exclusively confined to either verbal or visual elements, 
the present study highlights the importance of multimodal analysis. This entails an examination of images 
in terms of both their immediate textual context and layout and the dominant political and cultural frames 
informing journalistic interpretations of events (see also Reese, 2010). In this regard, the study further 
illuminates the active role of Western news media in reproducing narratives of the Ukraine conflict that 
tend to legitimize the actions of Western leaders while assigning blame primarily to Russia (see also Boyd-
Barrett, 2015). The deconstruction of these dominant media narratives is especially urgent, as the Ukraine 
conflict is being used to recreate Cold War divisions and to naturalize superpower interests. 
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